Using programmer-written compiler extensions to catch security holes
Ken Ashcraft, Dawson Engler · Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy/Proceedings of the ... IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · 2005
This paper shows how system-specific static analysis can find security errors that violate rules such as "integers from untrusted sources must be sanitized before use" and "do not dereference user-supplied pointers." In our approach, programmers write system-specific extensions that are linked into the compiler and check their code for errors. We demonstrate the approach's effectiveness by using it to find over 100 security errors in Linux and OpenBSD, over 50 of which have led to kernel patches. An unusual feature of our approach is the use of methods to automatically detect when we miss code actions that should be checked.
Cited by 204 works. doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004368
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