An efficient algorithm for the “optimal” stable marriage
Robert W. Irving, Paul Leather, Dan Gusfield · Journal of the ACM · 1987
In an instance of size n of the stable marriage problem, each of n men and n women ranks the members of the opposite sex in order of preference. A stable matching is a complete matching of men and women such that no man and woman who are not partners both prefer each other to their actual partners under the matching. It is well known [2] that at least one stable matching exists for every stable marriage instance. However, the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm produces a marriage that greatly favors the men at the expense of the women, or vice versa. The problem arises of finding a stable matching that is optimal under some more equitable or egalitarian criterion of optimality. This problem was posed by Knuth [6] and has remained unsolved for some time. Here, the objective of maximizing the average (or, equivalently, the total) “satisfaction” of all people is used. This objective is achieved when a person's satisfaction is measured by the position of his/her partner in his/her preference list. By exploiting the structure of the set of all stable matchings, and using graph-theoretic methods, an O ( n 4 ) algorithm for this problem is derived.
Cited by 258 works. doi:10.1145/28869.28871 Open-access PDF
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References
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