HAIL
Kevin D. Bowers, Ari Juels, Alina Oprea · Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security · 2009
We introduce HAIL (High-Availability and Integrity Layer), a distributed cryptographic system that allows a set of servers to prove to a client that a stored file is intact and retrievable. HAIL strengthens, formally unifies, and streamlines distinct approaches from the cryptographic and distributed-systems communities. Proofs in HAIL are efficiently computable by servers and highly compact---typically tens or hundreds of bytes, irrespective of file size. HAIL cryptographically verifies and reactively reallocates file shares. It is robust against an active, mobile adversary, i.e., one that may progressively corrupt the full set of servers. We propose a strong, formal adversarial model for HAIL, and rigorous analysis and parameter choices. We show how HAIL improves on the security and efficiency of existing tools, like Proofs of Retrievability (PORs) deployed on individual servers. We also report on a prototype implementation.
Cited by 749 works. doi:10.1145/1653662.1653686
Authors
References
- Universal classes of hash functions
- New hash functions and their use in authentication and set equality
- Provable data possession at untrusted stores
- Pors
- Compact Proofs of Retrievability
- Scalable and efficient provable data possession
- Dynamic provable data possession
- Proactive Secret Sharing Or: How to Cope With Perpetual Leakage
- UMAC: Fast and Secure Message Authentication
- LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication