OCB
Phillip Rogaway, Mihir Bellare Y, John Black et al. · Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security · 2001
We describe a parallelizable block-cipher mode of operation that simultaneously provides privacy and authenticity. OCB encrypts-and-authenticates a nonempty string M ε {0,1}• using \lceil |M|/n\rceil + 2 block-cipher invocations, where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Additional overhead is small. OCB refines a scheme, IAPM, suggested by Charanjit Jutla. Desirable properties of OCB include: the ability to encrypt a bit string of arbitrary length into a ciphertext of minimal length; cheap offset calculations; cheap session setup; a single underlying cryptographic key; no extended-precision addition; a nearly optimal number of block-cipher calls; and no requirement for a random IV. We prove OCB secure, quantifying the adversary's ability to violate the mode's privacy or authenticity in terms of the quality of its block cipher as a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) or as a strong PRP, respectively.
Cited by 368 works. doi:10.1145/501983.502011
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