IP covert timing channels
Serdar Cabuk, Carla E. Brodley, Clay Shields · Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security · 2004
A network covert channel is a mechanism that can be used to leak information across a network in violation of a security policy and in a manner that can be difficult to detect. In this paper, we describe our implementation of a covert network timing channel, discuss the subtle issues that arose in its design, and present performance data for the channel. We then use our implementation as the basis for our experiments in its detection. We show that the regularity of a timing channel can be used to differentiate it from other traffic and present two methods of doing so and measures of their efficiency. We also investigate mechanisms that attackers might use to disrupt the regularity of the timing channel, and demonstrate methods of detection that are effective against them.
Cited by 456 works. doi:10.1145/1030083.1030108
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