A security infrastructure for distributed Java applications
Dirk Balfanz, D. Dean, Michael Spreitzer · 2002
We describe the design and implementation of a security infrastructure for a distributed Java application. This work is inspired by SDSI/SPKI, but has a few twists of its own. We define a logic for access control, such that access is granted iff a proof that it should be granted is derivable in the logic. Our logic supports linked local name spaces, privilege delegation across administrative domains, and attribute certificates. We use SSL to establish secure channels through which principals can "speak", and have implemented our access control system in Java. While we implemented our infrastructure for the Placeless Documents System, our design is applicable to other applications as well. We discuss general issues related to building secure, distributed Java applications that we discovered.
Cited by 47 works. doi:10.1109/secpri.2000.848443
Authors
References
- SPKI Certificate Theory
- The SSL Protocol Version 3.0
- A calculus for access control in distributed systems
- The TLS protocol
- Extending document management systems with user-specific active properties
- Proof-carrying authentication
- On SDSI’s linked local name spaces
- Establishing identity without certification authorities
- Inside Java™ Platform Security: Architecture API Design and Implementation
- On SDSI's linked local name spaces