Inference, Deduction, Logic
Ian Rumfitt · Oxford University Press eBooks · 2012
Gilbert Ryle tried to carry his ‘anti-intellectualist’ crusade into the province of logic, long taken to be one of the opposition's strongholds. Throughout that crusade, Ryle rightly stressed the importance of our various cognitive skills—skills that cannot be reduced to, or codified as, knowledge of propositions. A good logician will possess many skills of this kind; indeed, what distinguishes a master of the subject is not so much his knowing many logical theorems—knowledge that, in Ryle's terms—as his knowing how to deploy them in solving problems. All the same, while Ryle could have contented himself with developing these points to amplify and support his claims about the importance and irreducibility of knowing how to, he went much further and offered an account of the nature of logic and its applicability. That account seems to me to be wrong in almost every particular, but elements of it continue to exert an influence. In this chapter, I aim to identify its most basic flaws and sketch a better treatment of the topic with a view to elucidating the way in which knowing how to and knowing that interact as we exercise our capacity for deductive argument.
Cited by 19 works. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0015