ARMED: How Automatic Malware Modifications Can Evade Static Detection?
Raphael Labaca Castro, Corinna Schmitt, Gabi Dreo Rodosek · International Conference on Information Management · 2019
Modifying existing malicious software until malware scanners misclassify it as clean is an attractive technique for cybercriminals. In particular, fully automatizing the process can bring adversaries to generate faster effective threats. Recent studies suggest that injecting successful malware modifications could lead to corrupt executable files despite of detection. Therefore, we propose ARMED - Automatic Random Malware Modifications to Evade Detection - to bypass classifiers by automatizing valid malware generation based on detected threats. The goal is to understand how successful automatic perturbations can be used to avoid detection. In order to reach this goal, we take portable executable malware and add a number of small random injections to evade detection without affecting the malware structure. Our experiments proved that only six perturbations are required to create new functional malware samples exhibiting exactly the same behavior yet with up to 80% less detections based on original malware that was previously detected. We show that within a few minutes an adversary could take a previously detected malware and convert it in a clean new mutation bypassing static malware scanners.
Cited by 39 works. doi:10.1109/infoman.2019.8714698
Authors
References
- Mersenne twister
- Random Number Generators
- Data mining methods for detection of new malicious executables
- EEL
- Adaptive real-time anomaly detection using inductively generated sequential patterns
- Limits of Static Analysis for Malware Detection
- TestU01
- Biologically inspired defenses against computer viruses
- A Practical System for Intermodule Code Optimization at Link-Time
- Malware Obfuscation Techniques: A Brief Survey