김정은 시대 북한의 핵전략: 왜 확증보복태세인가?

김홍익 · 2021

Ever since Vipin Narang offered three approaches of regional nuclear powers’ strategy, that are catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation postures, a number of studies have been conducted to analyze North Koreas nuclear strategy following theses approaches. This study is aimed to argue that North Korea has adopted an assured retaliation posture under Kim Jong Uns regime. Narang’s Nuclear Posture Optimization Theory on North Korea suggested variables for research, including availability of reliable third-party patron, conventionally-superior, proximate offensive threat, and party-military arrangements. Drawing on the model, first, North Korea does not see China as an enduring reliable patron. Second, despite seized mentality, North Korea does not consider the ROK-US alliance to be acute threats to its regime survival. Third, North Korea maintains assertive party-military relations as well as command and control system on nuclear weapons, as Kim Jong Un holds the position of the Supreme Commander and the Chairman of Central Military Commission. Therefore, I assert that North Koreas Nuclear strategy under Kim Jong Uns regime is the assured retaliation posture. In addition, North Koreas laws, related official documents on nuclear weapons and nuclear missile activities meet the characteristics of the assured retaliation posture.

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