Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks
Elena Gabriela Barrantes, David H. Ackley, Trek S. Palmer et al. · 2003
Many remote attacks against computer systems inject binary code into the execution path of a running program, gaining control of the program's behavior.If each defended system or program could use a machine instruction set that was both unique and private, such binary code injection attacks would become extremely difficult if not impossible.A binary-to-binary translator provides an economic and flexible implementation path for realizing that idea.As a proof of concept, we describe a randomized instruction set emulator (RISE) based on the open-source Valgrind x86-to-x86 binary translator.Although currently very slow and memory-intensive, our prototype RISE can indeed disrupt binary code injection attacks against a program without requiring its recompilation, linking, or access to source code.We describe the RISE implementation, give evidence demonstrating that RISE defeats common attacks, consider consequences of the dense x86 instruction set on the method's effects, and discuss limitations of the RISE prototype as well as design tradeoffs and extensions of the underlying idea.
Cited by 35 works. doi:10.1145/948143.948147
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